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The Trouble with Pseudoskepticism
The continuing rejection of anthropogenic global warming by non-experts despite overwhelming scientific consensus is rationally untenable and best described as “pseudoskeptical;” it is akin to AIDS denialism, the advocacy of intelligent design, and anti-vaccination movements.

Lawrence Torcello
Whatever else might be argued about the nature of science, genuine scientific research inherently involves skeptical rigor. Discrete scientific disciplines approach topics of study in ways unique to the discipline’s methodological needs. A paleoclimatologist cannot conduct her investigations in the same manner that a pharmacological chemist working in a laboratory will conduct hers. Nevertheless, science does have at least one reliable component: the skeptical analysis of data; in order to be studied scientifically a hypothesis must be testable.  In other words, science, regardless of its particular field, is a fundamentally skeptical endeavor involving the testing of hypotheses, coupled with efforts to protect test results from confounding variables, including the researchers’ own biases. The integrally skeptical nature of science is most evident in the fact that science advances through efforts to disprove hypotheses, even when hope is held for their confirmation. This is described well by philosopher Karl Popper: 
The point is that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it. Few of us, unfortunately practice this precept; but other people, fortunately, will supply the criticism for us if we fail to supply it ourselves. Yet criticism will be fruitful only if we state our problem as clearly as we can and put our solution in a sufficiently definite form—a form in which it can be critically discussed (Popper, xix, 1959).

The efforts Popper describes are reflected in standard scientific practices such as repeated and controlled experimentation, the publication of findings only after peer-reviewed critique, and the requirement that such findings be presented openly so that other researchers may attempt to replicate and independently confirm or reject them under the same rigorous constraints. Indeed, all of this is a necessary prerequisite for any findings to take on a meaningful level of scientific acceptance, let alone consensus.  A scientific theory only becomes accepted as theory once the laws observed, findings predicted, and facts organized under that theory have been so rigorously tested and confirmed over time that it becomes highly implausible (if nevertheless logically possible) that the stated theory should ever be refuted. Any scientific theory as a whole will represent the accumulated and organized explanatory force of numerous, repeatedly tested data points.  Thus skeptical critique is necessarily and inextricably part and parcel of the scientific process. 
As contrasted with science, however, the most evident characteristic of pseudoscience is its utter credulity—indeed its dependence on credulity as a methodological aspect of investigation.  Simply put, while scientists are busy attempting to disprove a favored hypothesis, and as such are guarding themselves against the ever-present danger of confirmation bias, pseudoscientists actively seek confirming evidence for what they have already deemed to be the case. This is so even as pseudoscientists eagerly attempt to appear skeptical. Paranormal investigators of the pseudoscientific stripe provide excellent examples of this pretense. To call oneself a “paranormal investigator” (as opposed to an investigator of paranormal claims a la Joe Nickell) is to already confess a belief that there is something paranormal to investigate; the pursuit itself begs the essential question. We do not fault the biologist for her well-warranted and noncontroversial belief in biological life, but we very well can fault the paranormal investigator for so eagerly believing in the paranormal. Yet pseudoscientists strive to appear skeptical, perhaps in part to win for themselves some of the mandate or regard many people reserve for genuine skepticism. In their attempts at wearing the garb of skepticism, pseudoscientists often assert the shortcomings, failures, or dangers of some given, well-established scientific consensus. When a pseudoscientist lacking expertise in a particular scientific domain makes a show of openly contradicting well-established claims of scientific consensus, as is often the case with so-called “alternative medicine,” the pseudoskeptical component of pseudoscience is made manifest.   
The term “pseudoskepticism” was coined by the late sociologist and founding member of CSICOP, Marcello Truzzi. The term, as originally used by Truzzi, is meant to identify a failure among self-identified skeptics to remain agnostic in the face of extraordinary or supernatural claims. Truzzi’s concern was that skeptics not abandon reasonable agnosticism in favor of a dismissive cynicism. Instead, Truzzi would have us remain true to the spirit of scientific inquiry by proportioning our beliefs to the strength of evidence available. And when there is no supporting evidence available for a claim, Truzzi would have us call that claim unwarranted, rather than disproven (Truzzi, 1987). Since being introduced by Truzzi, the term pseudoskepticism has commonly been misused by promoters of the paranormal (and offended magical thinkers) as an ad hominem repudiation of their scientifically-minded critics. Perhaps because of this misappropriation, the term has failed to play a prominent role in the skeptic’s lexicon. This is unfortunate, because it is a useful term, and there is no compelling justification for associating the term exclusively with the obstinate denial of paranormal claims.​[1]​ Dogmatic rejection of reliable evidence, regardless of what that evidence supports, is always misguided. Of course, given the nature of most paranormal claims, and certainly those of the supernatural variety, it is improbable if not impossible that sufficient scientific evidence could ever be gathered to justify warranted assertion. To admit this is not a sign of pseudoskepticism as Truzzi promoted the term, but rather recognition that some types of claims, even if true, are beyond the scope of what can be scientifically supported. In contrast, pseudoskeptical cynicism is on display whenever non-experts dogmatically deny the scientific explanations held in consensus by legitimate experts. For pseudoskepticism is precisely the skeptical artifice used by pseudoscientists when marching in parade against the alleged oppression or conspiracy of mainstream science. Since scientific consensus is arrived at through the organized skepticism inherent to the scientific process, the term pseudoskepticism is most appropriately identified as the negligent and unwarranted denial of established scientific consensus.
Thus, for the sake of clarity and application, I want to reconvene Truzzi’s useful designation, and to expand upon the concept of pseudoskepticism to include that well-known pseudointellectual performance which involves the rejection of assertions already firmly established through the rigorous scientific process. Pseudoskepticism is a form of cynicism posturing as skepticism. It is fatuously premised on the assumption that doubt for doubt’s sake is inherently rational—call this the “cynic’s fallacy.” Such is obviously not the case when there is strong supporting evidence in favor of a given claim. This form of cynicism tends to generate hostility toward scientific consensus, or misunderstanding of what, at all, is entailed in such consensus. Of course, this is not to argue that one cannot legitimately question scientific consensus, for indeed, without constant testing and questioning, science would be in danger of stagnation. Scientific inquiry flourishes in the context of open intellectual contest, as evidenced by its skeptical nature.​[2]​ In scientific endeavors, a consensus only exists because all attempts to discount a given claim have instead served to strengthen the evidence for it. Pseudoskepticism, alternatively, can be understood in relation to three propositions put forth by Bertrand Russell in “On the Value of Skepticism” (1928). As Russell puts it:
There are matters about which those who have investigated them are agreed; the dates of eclipses may serve as an illustration. There are other matters about which experts are not agreed. Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. Einstein's view as to the magnitude of the deflection of light by gravitation would have been rejected by all experts not many years ago, yet it proved to be right. Nevertheless the opinion of experts, when it is unanimous, must be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be right than the opposite opinion. The scepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: (1) that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; (2) that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert; and (3) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the ordinary man would do well to suspend his judgment (Russell p.2, 1928).

The identification of pseudoskepticism is consistent with Russell’s insights regarding the value of expertise. Whenever those outside the realm of active research into a particular topic willfully and without justification contradict established scientific consensus on that topic, they are acting as pseudoskeptics.  Thus pseudoskepticism is most often, if not always, displayed by those who lack expertise in a particular field and therefore most reasonably ought to proportion their belief to the accepted scientific consensus, when such consensus exists. 
Accordingly, when experts hold a consensus, skepticism or denial of that consensus on the part of laypersons is unreasonable and is therefore properly identified as pseudoskeptical. After asserting his skeptical propositions, Russell goes on to argue that if these simple propositions were to be accepted, they would have positive, even revolutionary implications for human life. Russell therewith suggests that his skeptical principles have certain moral and social implications. I submit that seeing Russell to be correct in this regard requires only minimum reflection upon the ethical responsibilities attached to inquiry, and on the harms that threaten society when superstitious and pseudoskeptical thinking are accepted as the status quo. 
Prime examples of pseudoskepticism, and the dangers of it, are found in AIDS denialism, in anti-vaccination advocacy, and, perhaps most prominently in our current political mainstream, in the denialism of anthropogenic global warming. It is worth dwelling on the latter form of pseudoskepticism for a moment, for global warming pseudoskepticism is on the rise in the industrialized nations most responsible for climate change.​[3]​ At the same time, those who are most vulnerable to climate change are those least responsible for it and least able to adapt to it. As such, the moral hazard involved in this form of pseudoskepticism compounds its global dangers. Much can be said about the scientific facts of global warming and all of it is available for anyone who wants to put the effort in to learning those facts.​[4]​ Rather than rehearsing the facts here, I want to focus on the reasonableness of sticking with expert consensus, when such consensus exists, as the most practical method of avoiding pseudoskepticism.  
Regularly, in the course of teaching Critical Thinking to college students, I find that when informal logical fallacies are first encountered at the conceptual level students tend to see them everywhere, like a kind of ideological pareidolia. However, as I tell my students, an informal fallacy is a fallacy because of what is not presented with it: namely well-reasoned arguments, precise definitions, and supportive evidence. It is not the case, as Russell points out so effectively, that every appeal to expertise ought to be considered a fallacious appeal to authority. This is not to say that experts cannot be wrong, but it is always more reasonable to appeal to an expert than a non-expert when one lacks appropriate expertise oneself. It stands to reason that the more experts agree on a particular topic, the more cause there is for non-experts to defer to their consensus.​[5]​ 









^1	  The concept of false skepticism is occasionally applied more usefully, and still consistently with Truzzi’s use of “pseudoskepticism,” against those who support dubious forms of denialism on dogmatic or ideological grounds (as is the case, for examples, with AIDS denialism). (These are the same dubious forms of denialism identified in the present essay.) See especially Richard Cameron Wilson’s “Against the Evidence” (2008) as well as his Don’t Get Fooled Again (2008). I maintain, with Wilson, that pseudoskepticism is most often a product of ideological motivation, rather than of balanced inquiry. Beyond embracing the dogmatism of ideology, the pseudoskeptic can be identified by a misguided, cynical, and fallacious “doubt for doubt’s sake.” However, my emphasis is exclusively on the denialism of well-established scientific consensus, as that denialism occurs outside of the legitimate scientific process. I place emphasis on such denialism again here, as I have elsewhere (see Torcello 2011), in order to provide a more consistent criterion by which to identify pseudoskepticism, and in order to attach moral culpability to it in the context of political discourse.    
^2	  In the course of normal scientific investigation, a scientific consensus may be challenged by researchers actively investigating the relevant topic; however, the burden is upon the researchers to demonstrate their alternative hypothesis within the standard parameters of the scientific process (i.e. empirical research, peer-review, repeated independent replication by other researchers, etc.) To be clear, doubt of established consensus in so far as it plays a role in legitimate research guided by the scientific process is not pseudoskeptical, but ignoring established scientific consensus is pseudoskeptical.
^3	  Much of the increasing pseudoskepticism regarding global warming is attributable to a well-organized, and well documented, campaign against legitimate climate science on the part of corporate polluters—and politicians under the financial influence of such corporate interests. See George Monbiot’s Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning (2007), and Chris Mooney’s The Republican War on Science (2007).
^4	  A good place to begin learning about anthropogenic global warming is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was created to serve as an authoritative source for disseminating information on the scientific findings regarding climate change (http://www.ipcc.ch/). Another extremely valuable source (perhaps even more valuable than the IPCC reports for those who are just beginning to learn about the science of climate change) is the website RealClimate: Climate Science from Climate Scientists  (http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2007/05/start-here/). Another informative source is the website Skeptical Science: Getting Skeptical about Global Warming Skepticism. http://www.skepticalscience.com/. I would prefer, for obvious reasons, if the subtitle read “Getting Skeptical about Global Warming Pseudoskepticism.” Finally, the National Center for Science Education (http://ncse.com/climate) has made the defense of climate science a part of its mandate, a move which ought to be applauded widely by all advocates of science and skepticism.
^5	  Massimo Pigliucci provides a very useful discussion of expertise, and how to sort through expertise, along with an important exploration of how politics can thwart the public’s proper understanding of science in cases like climate change in his recent Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science from Bunk (2010).
^6	  Elsewhere, I have argued for an ethical duty among academics, politicians, and journalists to publicly confront and counter pseudoskeptical claims against scientific consensus when such claims are made in the context of public policy debates. See my, “The Ethics of Inquiry, Scientific Belief, and Public Discourse,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 3 (2011). 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